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Economics, Darwinism, and the Case of
Disciplinary Imports
By VALENTIN COJANU
ABSTRACT. The problem of causality in economics is still contended
by various epistemological alternatives. The article builds on the
received view of Darwinism in economics and examines the way in
which economics and biology find common ground in concepts and
assumptions that reflect causal commonalities of the natural and the
social world. We claim that the role the contingent pattern plays in
understanding socioeconomic change provides reasons to concede
corrections to a rule-based causal mechanism. The article concludes
on the merits of advancing the ontological equivalent of interdiscipli-
nary studies as one possible standard in reference to which to judge
the epistemic adequacy of any import.
Introduction
The economists’ query for causal explanation seems to have found
in Darwin’s theory of natural selection a much needed epistemic
bridge between the natural and social orders of life; in short, a
conceptual framework to analyze complex social systems. In contrast
to equally vaunted alternatives like chaos theory or entropic models,
Darwinian thought applies directly to habitats and their populat-
ing biota struggling for survival on the basis of encoded rules for
inheritance and adaptation. In concurrence with them, it has gained
credibility for its paradigmatic interpretation of nature, time, and
history, often likened to a complete philosophical system founded
on evolutionary logic.
Economists have frequently subjected their method of study to
cross-fertilization from natural sciences, apparently because of their
higher status among fellow sciences. Philosopher John Stuart Mill
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(1874: 106) was one of its early advocates when he argued that missing
explanations should be found in “some other science” so that an
economist can get his policy recommendations accepted. Millian
echoes may still be heard in appeals like that of Vromen (2001), who
deplores the incapacity of mainstream economics to absorb new
analytical tools as fast as other sciences expand their investigative
possibilities. Darwin’s theory of natural selection is a vivid example
illustrating the influences currently feeding into economics across
established disciplinary boundaries, from biology, neurology, game
theory, computer science, and psychology, to name a few.
Other scholars beg to differ and condition interdisciplinary fertili-
zation to the existence of a common ontological ground in the first
place. The Kantian scrutiny of the rational mind had been premised
on the observation, added in a later preface (1787), that “we do not
enlarge but disfigure the sciences when we lose sight of their respec-
tive limits and allow them to run into one another” (Kant 1781: 11).
Staying faithful to this credo has proved a laborious task for social
science scholars. From Vico to Schumpeter, the idea of a universal
social science has not eventuated in a complete system of thought,
nor have the modern thinkers been more successful in unifying
into a Grand Theory such novel yet disparate conceptualizations
as “single natural-historical model of world” (Mayhew 1998),
“realist social theorizing” (Lawson 2002), or “historical social systems”
(Wallerstein 2004).
For Donald Schön (1979: 255), the impediments for a necessary
reassessment of science according to the particular needs of social
study “have more to do with problem setting than with problem
solving, more to do with ways in which we frame the purposes to be
achieved than with the selection of optimal means for achieving
them.” From this perspective, the parallel between economics and
other sciences is valid (and so are the ensuing disciplinary imports)
only to the extent it resonates within a common epistemology and not
the other way round, or by substitution devising epistemic compo-
nents (for example, ontologies and methodologies) consistent with
conjectures hypothesized outside the social realm.
The import of Darwinian thought is particularly well suited to
discuss the two alternative visions of science as it brings in an
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apparently negligible difference, yet a crucial one, as we shall suggest,
between the biological individual and the social actor. This article’s
aim, therefore, is to expose the defective nature of disciplinary imports
as long as they arise across themes of study of distinct ontological
concern. Somewhat paradoxically, biology via evolutionary theory
provides not only a case for questioning, but also one for streng-
thening the scope of interdisciplinary work, although from new
perspectives. Our choice is to interpret Darwinism in reference to
contingency, a concept defining a mode of reasoning of its own, and
to explain the apparent difficulty of integrating it into social sciences
and economics in particular.
At first sight, Darwinism may not seem the obvious conceptual
platform against which we should aim to make our point. In lieu of
exhibiting convergent intellectual lineage, the evolutionary theory
remains so far a controversial issue of science depending on the
competing paradigm one embraces. Were natural history to unfold
anew from the beginning, it may necessarily arrive at the same
outcomes (encoded in life structures) if one adopts Simon Conway-
Morris’s view of convergent evolution, as much as it may lead to
different ones (arbitrarily determined) if one listens to Stephen Jay
Gould’s plea for punctuated equilibrium.
Yet, it is our claim that opposing the basic premises of the two
systems of thought, in other words opposing optimal design (that is,
the lawful process of selection and adaptation) to contingency (that is,
the fragmentary and directionless evolutionary chain), possibly plays
a bigger role in our theorizing about the social and economic world
than mere interdisciplinary fertilization suggests. As scholars of diverse
proclivities have noticed (for example, Dietz, Burns, and Buttel 1990;
Thurtle 1998; Runciman 2005; Prindle 2006; Corning 2008; Abrantes
and El-Hani 2009), biologists’ indecisiveness has implications so pro-
found that they trespass their subject matter and touch on the very
foundations of science. We in effect witness a major paradigm shift
heralding a post-Darwinian era of a new theory altogether. So, this
article suggests, Darwinism’s domestic controversies serve well to
confront what its possible transition to “a meta-philosophy of life’s
change” (Prindle 2006) would possibly mean for economic and social
thought.
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The argument proceeds gradually from an exposition of Darwinian-
based ontology of economics to a rereading of evolutionary tenets in
a code characteristic of the last developments. According to this plan,
the second section examines the way in which economics and biology
find common ground in concepts and assumptions that reflect causal
commonalities of the natural and the social world. Not only has this
interchange eventuated in a paradigmatic ontology for the use of
economists, but it has also changed for good the basic economic
tenets of rationality and causality.
As our article emphasizes, Darwinian logic was not only a product
of careful and systematic collection of scientific evidence, it was also
a reflection on the complexity of life, a professed understanding of
sequences of unique events necessarily leading to superior forms of
life. Evolutionary economic thought seems to have preserved Darwin’s
belief that determinacy is left no alternative except for divine inter-
vention. A third section questions that opinion and claims that the role
contingency plays in understanding chance and change, the two
defining components of the historical patterns of evolution, provides
reasons to concede corrections to a rule-based causal mechanism. The
article concludes on the merits of advancing the ontological equivalent
of interdisciplinary studies as one possible standard in reference to
which to judge the epistemic adequacy of any import.
Overview of a Darwinian Ontology of Economics
The scholarship of evolutionary economics of the last two decades, of
which Hodgson (2009) offers an exemplary collection, builds the case
for understanding economic behaviour as ultimately a reflection of the
principles of natural selection. Underpinned by varied analytical trials,
including mathematical and game theory modeling, as well as labo-
ratory and field experiments, the biological shaping of social action
construes a new genre of rationality within a causal mechanism both
more appealing to the needs of studying a wide array of patterns of
human behaviour (for example, cooperation and competition, altru-
ism and self-interest, reward and punishment), and more sensitive
to changing social contexts than the neoclassical economics that it
purports to replace.
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Although who qualifies as Darwinian may still be a puzzle (compare
Prindle 2006; Bowler 2009), Darwinism itself is commonly understood
(Dietz, Burns, and Buttel 1990; Nichols 2002; Fracchia and Lewontin
2005) in its neo-Darwinian synthesis, which typically explains evolu-
tion by random mutation, natural selection, genetic drift, and chance
factors. In this expression, the essential feature of the mechanism of
natural selection is its emergence at the behest of both necessity and
chance: selective pressure leads to local adaptation of useful traits
preserved on the basis of random variations of the genetic material.
Evolutions so concur to orderly outcomes in which individuals
compete for survivability benefits.
Many have recognized in Darwin’s theory a conscious analogue to
the 18th-century economics propounding Thomas Malthus’s “struggle
for existence” and Adam Smith’s “laissez-faire” concepts (Gould 2007:
224; Comfort 2008; Hodgson 2009; Bowler 2009). Economists later
returned the favor to biology when Marshall and Veblen infused
economic analysis with evolutionary tenets. Although marred by
hesitant departure from “mechanics” in the case of Marshall (Raffaelli
2008) and “psychologism” in the case of Veblen (Becker 2007), the
inspiration they drew from Darwinism was influential in opening
economics to adjacent fields of social science like sociological,
historical, and institutional research.
It is of no concern here why such early calls were overpowered by
the then ascending neoclassical current. What matters instead is that
presently economics is remodeling its canonical model of monetary
payoff-maximizing actors in a way that credits Marshall’s assertion that
“the Mecca of the economist lies in economic biology rather than
economic dynamics” (1890: 19). Contemporary homo economicus is
endowed with selective characteristics such as “maladaptive traits” (for
example, altruism) for the survival values they confer on population
(Simon 1990); “reasoning instincts” for their adaptive capability to
express human intentionality (Cosmides and Tooby 1994); or “infor-
mational inputs” for enabling formal research to account for cultural
diversity (Vromen 2001).
In-depth explorations of evolutionary economics take one step
further from the use of analogy and metaphor and look for an
economic theory proper based on “genotypes” and “phenotypes”
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operative in social environments such as technology, business, or
science. The essential features of the selectionist paradigm have been
translated into full-fledged economic models like Population-Variety-
Reproduction-Selection (PVRS) (Lawson 2003: ch. 5) or Generative
Social Selection (GSS) (Hodgson and Knudsen 2008). These works
converge in adopting the customary evolutionary “RIL formulation”
(“replicators,” “interactors,” and “lineages”) (compare Abrantes and
El-Hani 2009), as do they also in pointing to social specificities
that would make direct translation of Darwinism into economics
unworkable.
On the one hand, analytical frameworks like PVRS or GSS work
toward virtually complete ontological models based on the properties
of some genetic makeup known as replicators (for example, habits
and routines, social rules, but also knowledge, techniques) to store,
transmit, and ensure copying fidelity of codified information among
the social units of selection known as interactors (for example, social
practices, firms, and institutions, but also ideas, values, and styles of
thought). Competition takes place within a self-reproducible environ-
ment in which human dispositions and propensities, for example, will
be important sources of variation.
On the other hand, these models and related literature (for example,
Dietz, Burns, and Buttel 1990; Nelson 2006; Martins 2009) admit that
selection in socioeconomic environments has nothing to do with
biological survival and growth. Appropriating Darwinian thought as a
universal way of theorizing, they say, should not distract us from
seeing that the ontologies of the human social world and biological
structures are different: the social realm features social preferences
and values, acts of whim, human agency, and emergent experiences
that fall short of developing a reproductive capability of their own and
are unlikely to submit themselves to the evolutionary logic.
This qualification notwithstanding, common sense observations
about, say, survivability of profitable firms or extinction of unprofit-
able ones, as well as evolutionary analysis applied to actual economic
behavior (for example, Stoelhorst 2007) show undeterred fascination
with Darwinism thanks to its “paradigmatic metanarrative” (Stuart-Fox
1999) providing the causal mechanism of variation and selective
retention to social evolutions.
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As is the case of all disciplinary imports, whether Darwinism is
being adopted as a methodological tool or as a system of thought
seems to rest on a particularly thin argument: the social mechanism
does exhibit working functionality within the logic of natural selection
in relation to reproductive differential success. Biology thus provides
an explanatory framework within which evolution of biotic or social
systems is viewed as a lawful process of selection and adaptation with
in-built directionality (towards survivability benefits). “The principle
of determinacy or universal causation,” argues Hodgson (2004: 178), is
the necessary ontological position on which to found the selective
mechanism. The causal process, he concludes, should focus “on its
key processual algorithms. Even if every step in the process cannot be
determined in detail, the exploration of the algorithmic process itself
helps to provide an explanation. The key algorithmic process empha-
sized by Darwin was natural selection” (2004: 190).
Darwinian social theorizing has been disputed on various grounds.
Some claim that non-biological Darwinism is “vacuous, culturally
impoverishing, or downright dangerous” (Comfort 2008), while more
critical interventions warn of the loss of much that is essential to the
understanding of social/cultural change when the explanation favors
the general reduction of history to evolutionary change (Thurtle 1998;
Fracchia and Lewontin 2005).
We aim at lifting the veil on the “concealed” part of the social reality
that cannot possibly find inclusive resolution on the evolutionary
methodological path. This is not to deny altogether the validity of
the evolutionary argument. A case in point is “ecological economics”
formulating the basic tenets according to which the human species
accommodates itself to the surrounding natural environment. As
one author put it, “we are, in effect, joint participants in a biological
contract” following our basic vocation as individuals and families in
“a collective survival enterprise” (Corning 2008).
The contour of our ensuing argument may be previewed in table 1
opposing Darwinism to a number of “pluralistic correctives” (Gould
2007: 449) or “paradigm shifts” (Erwin 2007) that biologists themselves
find suitable to amend Darwinian logic.1
Scholars of Darwinism in fact correct their study by regular recourse
to new evolutionary findings (compare Nichols 2002; Hodgson 2004;
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Runciman 2005; Prindle 2006; Corning 2008). Selection at several
hierarchical levels, for example, is now a common multi-level Dar-
winian approach, which proves that group selection or evolutionary
game theory lead to evolving cooperative/successful strategies in
managing the common goods. However, piecemeal amendments to
Darwinism have accumulated to the point these correctives suggest a
role for a logic of its own, a new logic of social and cultural systems
fundamentally different from that of biological populations in the
same way Darwin’s theory of natural selection marked a decisive shift
from creationism.
Table 1
Principles of Natural Selection and Correctives
Evolution by natural selection
Evolution advances by chance
mutations of the genetic
material and by selective
incorporation of some of this
variation into altered
organisms.
Chance acts as agent of
evolutionary change, while
differential survival has little










The process of selection takes
place at several levels of a
hierarchy of individuals, and
in conjunction with events of
branching speciation.
Adaptation
The result of natural selection is
adaptation that results from





there are also limits and
potentialities set by
non-adaptation.
Based on Darwin ([1859] 1867) and Gould (2007: 223–228, 449).
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In what follows, we look at the assumption that places history, one
of “the most difficult of the sciences” McNeill (2001), as “explanatory
paradigm” in a system of thought that combines “discrete systemic
logic and contingent actions” (Fracchia and Lewontin 2005) to explain
evolutionary patterns.
A Reinterpretation of Evolutionary Patterns Based on the
Role of Contingency
Contending pairs of arguments in relation to the limits of the princi-
ples of natural selection reflect more than mere work in progress.
According to Gould (2007: 248), the corrective framework has also
been extended into non-biological fields ranging from human tools
and technologies to learning theory, or to dynamics of human organi-
zations. As this enumeration suggests, the correctives reinterpret the
epistemological basis of integrating history into science: the empirical
base these socioeconomic studies work with is set against historical
patterns of human behavior, which may or may not include selection-
ist evolutionism.
In spite of its emphasis on cumulative change and transitional
variations, Darwin’s legacy has barely offered support in that direc-
tion. Only “miraculous interposition,” wrote Darwin in 1861 ([1859]
1998: 370), may (implausibly) interfere with lawful evolutionary
change; the missing evolutionary links that rule out divine intervention
are explained by “the extreme imperfection of the geological record”
([1859] 1867: 265) or by “the poorness of our paleontological collec-
tions” ([1859] 1867: 270). In fact, the apparently flawless logic of his
exposé On the Origin is interrupted by recurrent digressions on the
evidence “on an enormous scale” ([1859] 1876: 264) of absent transi-
tional links between species. Sudden appearance of whole groups of
species “would be fatal to the theory of evolution through natural
selection” ([1859] 1876: 282).
In light of newer evidence, Darwin’s dichotomized view of “divinity
vs. geological records” seems too limited. The discovery of the Cam-
brian fossils of the Burgess Shale in 1909 set out decades of scholarly
debate inviting revisions of the scientific method in respect to expla-
nations of a historical nature. An incredibly preserved geological
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formation, the Burgess Shale testifies for fragmented, not smooth,
evolutionary chains, and for inferior, not better, designs that, as it
happens, were marked for successful adaptation. The evidence, as
presented, for example, in Gould (1989) we have now of the surviving
lineages, an unremarkable minority of that geological moment, does
not stand in dissonance with Darwinian principles but confirms that
his hesitations were due.
Darwin’s ironic stance against divine intervention is nevertheless apt
to reflect a profound philosophical dilemma as much of his times as
of ours though. Philosopher William James (1884: 22) shed light on
one alternative (Darwin’s) when presenting his view of the meaning
of life:
The creator’s plan of the universe would thus be left blank as to many of
its actual details, but all possibilities would be marked down . . . But the
rest of the plan, including its final upshot, would be rigorously determined
once for all. So the creator himself would not need to know all the details
of actuality until they came.
Yet, his contemporary and no less meditative novelist Mark Twain
([1898] 2000: 27) was convinced that behind the human world’s visible
order lies comprehensible yet elusive causation. He penned Satan, a
supernatural character, explaining to a mortal companion:
To skip any one of the billion acts in Columbus’s chain would have wholly
changed his life. I have examined his billion of possible careers, and in
only one of them occurs the discovery of America. You people do not
suspect that all of your acts are of one size and importance, but it is true;
to snatch at an appointed fly is as big with fate for you as is any other
appointed act.
We follow this dispute in the following and argue that a reinterpre-
tation of Darwinian thought is due in light of the role the contingent
pattern plays in understanding change, whether of evolutionary,
economic, or cultural nature. Used interchangeably with randomness,
uniqueness, or arbitrariness, contingency emerges from the “shaping
of present results by long chains of unpredictable antecedent states,
rather than immediate determination by timeless laws of nature”
(Gould 2007: 211). Contingency is about the way we account for
change and for chance in one seamless stream of thought.
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As mentioned, much of the debate is inspired by Darwin himself
and a rereading of primary sources conflates the controversial nature
of the originator’s idea. In all six revised editions of the Origin, he
restates his belief “that Natural Selection has been the main but not
exclusive means of modifications” (Darwin [1859] 1867: 6). Is this
just a marginal note, being the very last sentence of its prefatory text?
Probably not, as mindful of possibly other accommodating explana-
tions, Darwin inserts a conclusive remark that seemingly refutes the
determinacy principle: “A grain in the balance may determine which
individuals shall live and which shall die . . . The slightest advantage in
certain individuals, at any age or during any season, over those with
which they come into competition, or better adaptation in however
slight a degree to the surrounding physical conditions, will, in the long
run, turn the balance” ([1859] 1867: 411, emphasis added).
If it is correct that one has therefore reasons to concede corrections
to a rule-based causal mechanism, we should then de-emphasize
(without denying) the role of the selectionist paradigm and attempt
to turn those tiny particulars (read: historical accidents) that disrupt
apparently transitional evolutionary states into a comprehensible
account. For Fracchia and Lewontin (1999), the starting task should
aim at correcting the flawed substitution of the metaphor “of evolu-
tion for history,” a malign consequence, they argue, of “the grand
twentieth-century movement to scientize all aspects of the study of
society.” In their analysis, the restrictiveness of the contingent pattern
of differential reproduction varies from “very strong constraints on
which states may succeed each other” in evolutionary contexts to
“purely random differential survival” in historical frames. The replica-
tion process may thus actually unfold in such unpredictable patterns
that causation becomes impossible to discern. If we proceed to the
next level and attempt to integrate contingency in our explanatory
framework, a double set of difficulties arises.
Understanding Chance
Our concept of causality needs further revising to account better for
facts of historical nature. Even if this field of investigation is gaining
ground as we speak, attempts have been made to acknowledge that
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unique events “always involve an element of arbitrariness, to analyse
events at a level of abstraction at which their particularities matter
and are not (often) repeated” (Runde and de Rond 2009). As noted,
the underlying rationale of the corrected Darwinian logic is partly
explained by mutations to DNA, although it should also accommodate
fragmentary or indiscernible evolutionary chains whose occurrence
lies in the realm of possible historical events, too.
The implication is twofold: things may happen because of prior,
pre-determined, knowable circumstances (for example, genetic codes,
commodity abundance, factor endowments) that support enduring
structures of society (that is, market economies, gains from trade), but
discontinuous or disruptive jumps in human evolution may equally
plausibly be the norm. Increased efforts have been lately independ-
ently arrived at findings proving that dominating features of socio-
economic reality as represented by such events as technology and
innovation (Bower and Christensen 1995), market entry (Runde and
de Rond 2009), economic forecasting (Taleb 2009), or institutional
setting (Wagner 2010) are able to set in motion unrelated causal chains
with greater frequency than usually assumed.
It would now be futile to ask which sequence of events, of chance,
or of necessity is prevalent in the social realm to establish so a
possible standard against which to accept or not the received Dar-
winian thought; their very co-existence speaks for a radically new
interpretation of life’s narrative. The interplay between history and
social theory admit a different, historically based evolutionary logic.
A model of replication and interaction, adapted though to account
for facts of social nature that escape evolutionary logic, cannot
confer “accidents” as important an explanatory role as granted to
“algorithmic” patterns of evolution.
A way out of this conundrum is suggested by a relatively new
tendency to accommodate the contradictory and idiosyncratic facts of
social reality in eclectic perspectives of socioeconomic evolutions.
Lawson (2003) argues that any explicative mechanism (or “transfor-
mational model” in his parlance) should be derived in an a posteriori
manner to be able to illuminate “the appearance of order, the match-
ing of part and whole, of individual and environment, even when this
outcome is not the product of conscious design” (2003: 125). In similar
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vein, other conceptual developments like “synergistic selection”
(Corning 2008), “multi-temporal social systems” (Liagouras 2009), or
“path dependent processes” (Martin 2010) have been added toward a
unifying epistemological vision.
Coalescing disparate explanations around historical patterns reveals
common, not different, ontologies across disciplines in the same way
mathematical logic connects scientists towards an algorithmic inter-
pretation of nature. In the words of Gould (1999: 298), “contingency
represents the historian’s mode of knowability.” Inheritance and vari-
ation work by sorting out individuals partly within selective mecha-
nisms reducible to known characteristics of organisms (for example,
the base pairs of DNA) and testable relative to expected outcomes
(for example, differential reproductive success). At the same time, the
contingent detail concurs with non-negligible force in turning un-
predictable into undetermined evolutionary threads by particulars of
organic and inorganic origin (for example, mass extinctions, natural
calamity, or non-adaptive side consequences).
Any interdisciplinary parallel may be traced (on the same ontologi-
cal ground) as long as the natural order exhibits trends of both
evolutionary and historical nature. In the social domain, usually
several contingencies are at play: tipping moments of social unrest,
plagues, emerging “power jumps,” irrecoverable scientific losses,
extreme dissolution of mores, and so forth. In like approaches, it is
admitted that socioeconomic domains are amenable to study even
though “the ultimate truth on the matter may be forever beyond our
grasp” (Runde and de Rond 2009: 17). Bundles of simultaneous
interplay of sequences of events undergo variations that render dif-
ferences of the same sequence’s/event’s manifestations irreconcilable
in time in the same way natural selection departs from controllably
encoded processes.
Understanding Change
A second difficulty of integrating contingency arises as we attempt to
find an evolutionary role for accidents, that is, evolutionary phases
diverging from the visible threads linked to adaptation to changing
local environments on the basis of our presumptive knowledge about
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what “adaptation” means in the first place. The received Darwinian
ontology remains undecided as to whether to expurgate residual
developmental errors from the selective process. On the one hand,
Hodgson and Knudsen (2008) argue about the supposed capability of
selection to retain “relatively successful adaptations” and generate
“increasing complexity”; on the other hand, Dietz, Burns, and Buttel
(1990) adopt the view that “the rules favored by cultural evolution will
not necessarily be the rules that maximize genetic fitness” (1990: 160).
This hesitation, however, does not actually call for a resolute
defense of either viewpoint. Once accidents enter the picture, the
need to pit superior (read: complex) against inferior (read: sub-
optimal) outcomes (that is, systems or institutional contexts) within a
universalized theorizing schema disappears. Adaptation among social
units of selection maintains its instrumental position in providing
progress with evolutionary meaning, in other words we can assert
whose selective characteristics prove successful on the basis of value
judgments ascribed to the evidence we collect. However, on a his-
torical scale, and that does not mean doing the historian’s work, our
perception of the mechanism of institutional change is only marginally
affected by such determined processes. Indeterminacy plays its role,
visibly enough to play down any perspective of rule-based explana-
tory mechanisms and hence inherent directionality.
Apparently, it cannot be simpler than that: the modern (for
example, the information age) prevails over the rudimentary (for
example, the machine age) in any account of economic progress,
while fitness peaks and troughs inside each era may be reasonably
acknowledged. It would be quite possible though, that our endpoints
on the historical passage be happenstances of parallel, maybe inter-
secting, yet not necessarily continuous progressions.
Diamond’s (2005) account of societal survivability provides one
of the closest representations of evolutionary accidents he subsumes
under the term “environment”: a five-set framework of contributing
factors like environmental damage, climate change, peaceful vicinities,
thriving neighbors, and societal responses to environmental problems.
His storytelling, supported by first-hand evidence, goes through rises
and falls of ancient and modern civilizations at the impact of collapse,
“a drastic decrease in human population size and/or political/
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economic/social complexity, over a considerable area, for an
extended time” (Diamond 2005: 3).
According to the argument he adduces, there remains little doubt
that a sizeable part of human evolution (for example, the Maya society
in Central America, the Anasazi society in the U.S. Southwest, or the
Norse Greenland) was doomed to extinction in spite of behavioral
complexity and facing similarly harsh environments as their contem-
porary survivors. Instead of developmental stages, he found chains
of historical events encompassing uniquely models of interaction
between people, environment, and cultures.
Gould’s reflections on the Burgess fauna invite to honest evaluation
of the causal framework for historical disciplines because “we must
admit that we have no evidence whatsoever—not a shred—that losers
in the great decimation were systematically inferior in adaptive design
to those that survived. Anyone can invent a plausible story after the fact”
(Gould 1989: 236). Memories of the near past suffice to reveal the
ambivalence surrounding a position that favors increasingly “superior”
behavioral patterns (whatever it would mean). Selection of a sort took
place both in communism and capitalism and surviving social practices
and rules have been perpetuated within each economic system accord-
ing to their own value judgments. And as was observed (for example,
Eyal, Szelényi, and Townsley 2001), communism may have succumbed
to the destructive effect of resource misallocation, although its vices and
virtues live on in novel institutional recombination.
Conceptualizing the causal efficacy of social structures errs on the
side of circular reasoning: better, functional institutions persist because
persistence within a circumstantial context is what makes them better
in the first place, not because of any prior confirmed hypothesis about
their superiority. A moment’s reflection prompts us to ask if transition
(that is, selection of surviving institutions) is really the issue as to the
sequential path of developmental stages of humankind, in the way
scholars like Karl Marx and Thorstein Veblen bequeathed political
and social thought. In spite or because of their markedly different
justifications (compare Liagouras 2009), a stage evolution is what we
continue to construe in the mainstream by assigning value judgments
to ever subtler evolutionary forms, as exemplified by the widely
adopted representation of hierarchies of varieties of capitalism.
Economics, Darwinism, and the Case of Disciplinary Imports 193
Concluding Remarks
Economics connects itself to biology on the premise that analogous
causal mechanisms, but different ontologies provide the adequate
explanatory framework in respect to which social and biological
populations are parts of the same genre, that is, evolutionary thinking.
This view is nevertheless built on an orderly course of events that is
both cognoscible and adaptively superior, an assumption Darwin
has never completely acknowledged. His own interpretation of the
passage of time seems to have suggested alternative mechanisms of
knowledge, in which chance and value judgments would cease to
necessarily underpin survivability and superior purposes.
There is no doubt that the selection process is indeed at work in the
interplay between chance and necessity to account for survivability
benefits, only that the sequence of events at a historical scale also
integrates the contingent pattern along the causal chain. The historical
setting of the social actor is a culturally laden meaningful context,
which is neutral and hence irrelevant to the biological individual.
Likewise, some biologists seem inclined to allow alternative paths
of evolutionary states to explain the innumerable combinations of
biota, in actual or imaginary developments. Contingency, we imply,
would adequately bring the ontology of evolutionary studies, of which
economics is markedly a subaltern, to a common denominator.
The historical nature of evolutions requires converging interpreta-
tions of the concepts of chance and change within ontologies of
equivalent significance. Irrespective of how much scientific evidence
(for example, new fossil records or artifacts of primeval man’s socie-
ties) we are able to amass, our theorizing of historical social systems
should also make room for explanations emphasizing (1) uniqueness
of contingent details, and (2) lack of inherent directionality of the
observed sequences of events.
Economics as historical reconstruction of nature’s social order
subjects the evidence to tests found on our converging path to
understanding its sense, its role, importance, and impact for human
economic progress. The sensible distinction between the social actor
and the biological individual rests on cultural attributions and histo-
rical significance. We may accept testing a wing’s optimal size for
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aerodynamic or thermal effect but contend that such a technical
exercise may be carried out with as much success for, say, an area’s
optimal growth size. However, the principle of “functional shift”
applies in both instances in the sense that what might have been
counted as non-adaptive features at one time remains so or becomes
“functional” precisely because of our view of the historical whole at
some other time.
Historical change is an ontological component that by definition
plays a significant role in historical disciplines. Although the lapse
of time may or may not uncover missing explanatory links, the
interdisciplinary equivalence on this ground means that Darwinian
thought be reduced to the role causal explanation plays in providing
a realistic view of the social world. The idea that great or unexpected
designs arise from trifling causes, or do not arise at all, is a historical
premise not amenable to conventional experiments of testing and
prediction, although it should nevertheless be part of our explicative
framework. Exclusive reliance on the causal mechanism may just
prove too elusive to pin down in a meaningful manner why things
occur the way they do.
Note
1. Gould (2007) also refers to systems of thought that question the restric-
tiveness of Darwinian thought from perspectives different of his own (for
example, “punctuated equilibrium”) such as the neutral theory of molecular
evolution introduced by Motoo Kimura in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
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